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ABSTRACT– Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are less likely and slower to downgrade firms
with performance-sensitive debt (PSD) if these downgrades increase borrowing costs. This
effect is not driven by selection into PSD contracts, borrowers hiding information from
CRAs, or by firms about to lose their investment grade classification. Moreover, originating
banks seem aware of the CRAs’ conflicts of interest, and sell loans with more embedded
conflicts more frequently. In contrast, secondary market participants do not price conflicts
of interest to the same extent. The recent settlements between the major CRAs and the
U.S. government do not appear to prevent credit inflation.
JEL classification: G14, G24, G28
keywords : Credit ratings, performance-sensitive debt, rating catering
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) play a key role in financial markets by assessing the
credit risk of debt issuers and financial securities. However, many observers have questioned
CRAs’ ability to provide reliable credit risk assessments. They argue that the issuer fee–
based business model, in which clients pay for their own ratings, distorts the incentives of
CRAs to the extent that the fear of a loss of reputation or the fear of regulatory penalties
are ineffective deterrents. Consistent with this concern, the two major CRAs, Standard and
Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s, recently settled with the U.S. government for contributing to
the Financial Crisis by inflating the credit ratings of residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). In these settlements, CRAs renewed
their commitment to credit rating quality. In this paper, we study whether the conflicts
of interest of CRAs prevail in the performance-sensitive debt (PSD) market, a much less
complex market than that of securitized products. Importantly, the availability of pricing
data, both at origination and in secondary markets, allows us to study whether market
participants internalize these conflicts. Moreover, unlike the market for RMBSs and CDOs,
the PSD market did not disappear after 2007. This allows us to study whether CRAs
effectively changed their behavior after the settlements.1
In performance-sensitive debt contracts, interest payments depend directly on a measure
of the borrower’s financial health, such as credit ratings or financial ratios. Normally, if
the borrower’s financial health deteriorates, the interest rate associated with the PSD loan
increases.2 In this paper, we focus on the $900 billion subset of the PSD market which has
interest payments that depend exclusively on credit ratings. In the context of these loans,
a CRA experiences a conflict of interest when a credit rating downgrade causes an increase
in the interest rate paid by the borrower (i.e., the client that pays the CRA for the credit
1Graham and Harvey (2001) survey 392 CFOs, and they find that 57% of CFOs consider credit ratings
as important, making credit ratings the second most important debt policy factor after financial flexibility.
Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Israelsen (2018) show that investors continue to rely on CRAs for assessing credit
risk post-Crisis.
2For example, a debt contract may stipulate an interest rate of LIBOR + 15 basis points if the borrower
is rated A+. This interest rate may increase to LIBOR + 25 basis points if the borrower is rated A (i.e., if
the borrower’s credit rating worsens).
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rating). Thus, we consider the interest rate increase that would result from a credit rating
downgrade as a measure of the conflicts of interest for CRAs for each loan. We then study
whether this measure affects a CRA’s rating behavior, such as the probability of issuing a
credit rating downgrade.
However, identifying conflicts of interest in PSD is empirically challenging. First, the
decision to take a PSD loan, and simultaneously the choice of interest payment schedules, is
endogenous. Firms can self-select into PSD either because they have positive inside informa-
tion (Begley, 2012) or because they are overly optimistic (Adam et al., 2020). Moreover, even
within PSD contracts, it is likely that there is a bias in a näıve comparison of the probability
of a downgrade between firms that chose credit rating–based PSD loans and those that did
not, with the former set of firms being downgraded less frequently. Second, there is another
form of selection often referred to as rating shopping (Skreta and Veldkamp, 2009; Faure-
Grimaud et al., 2009; Sangiorgi and Spatt, 2017). A firm may approach multiple CRAs,
then ultimately do business with the CRA that offers the most favorable credit rating. As a
result, credit ratings are inflated not due to CRAs yielding to conflicts of interest, but rather
due to unintentional errors inherent in the credit rating process.
Our empirical setting allows us to mitigate these concerns. First, the ability to observe
credit ratings through time allows us to exploit time-series variation within borrowers, ef-
fectively controlling for time-invariant characteristics of firms that may affect the choice of
PSD contract and subsequent credit rating downgrades. Since loan interest rate payment
schedules are determined at the time of origination of the loan, exploiting time-series vari-
ation in the cost of downgrades mitigates selection concerns. Second, the richness of the
data allows us to account for time-varying firm-level factors such as borrower quality and
managerial optimism, as well as various dimensions of loan contracts that are determined at
origination. Third, we include year fixed effects in all specifications to account for the fact
that the probability of a credit rating downgrade varies with the business cycle. Importantly,
although our more stringent specification includes fixed effects for firm, year, and current
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credit rating, we show that there is enough variation in the data to expect our analysis to
have sufficient power.
We start by investigating the relationship between the probability that a borrower is
downgraded by a CRA and the increase in borrowing costs that would result from a down-
grade. If CRAs internalize the additional cost to their client, a higher cost of a downgrade
should be associated with a lower probability of a downgrade. Consistent with this proposi-
tion, we find that a one standard deviation increase in the cost of a downgrade is associated
with a decreased downgrade likelihood of about 0.8 percentage points (pp) per quarter, which
is a 27% reduction relative to the unconditional mean. This result is robust to multiple re-
gression specifications (including the inclusion of loan fixed effects), to multiple definitions
for the variable that represents the cost of a downgrade, and to analyzing the downgrades
by S&P and Moody’s separately. We also show that, conditional on downgrading, CRAs
are slower to downgrade their clients when the downgrade is more costly. Importantly, our
analysis draws inferences from within-borrower relationships and CRA relationships over
time (i.e., from downgrades that occur after origination). This is inconsistent with bor-
rowers rating shopping or self-selecting into PSD loans. Our results are confirmed using
a nonparametric survival analysis that specifically models the hazard rate of credit rating
downgrades.
Next, we further sharpen our empirical strategy by exploiting variation in the relevancy
of each CRA’s rating. If two credit ratings by different CRAs disagree, most PSD contracts
will use the better rating to determine interest rates (Tchistyi et al., 2011). We find that the
tendency of CRAs to avoid downgrading their clients is concentrated precisely among those
instances in which their rating is decisive for setting borrowing costs, either because they are
the only CRA providing a credit rating or because they are the CRA that issued the better
credit rating. Overall, our findings are consistent with the proposition that CRAs yield to
conflicts of interest that result from the issuer fee–based business model of credit ratings.
One potential challenge to our interpretation of our results is that they could be driven
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by firms hiding negative financial information from CRAs rather than by CRAs catering to
their clients. CRAs issue credit ratings based on the information reported by firms without
conducting independent audits. Firms whose borrowing costs would experience a larger
increase in the eventuality of a downgrade might be more likely to hide negative information.
Inconsistent with this concern, we show that CRA rating behavior does not vary with the
ease with which firms can hide or manipulate financial information, as proxied by a firm’s
fraction of intangibles assets and by the firm’s R&D expenditures. Moreover, we show that
CRAs yield to conflicts of interest even within a group of firms that were negatively affected
by a (very public) shock to commodity values, a setting in which information asymmetries
should play a much less important role.
Another potential challenge to our interpretation is that our results may be driven by
loans associated with firms that are close to losing their investment grade classification.
CRAs could have implicit approval from investors to inflate credit ratings for those firms
because the loss of an investment grade classification could translate not only to increased
borrowing costs and a lower future availability of funding for firms, but also to reduced
investment opportunities for investors due to regulatory or investment restrictions (Bruno
et al., 2016). Inconsistent with this concern, we show that results are not driven by the
subset of loans described above.3
PSD provides an insurance mechanism for lenders that directly compensates them for the
deterioration of a borrower’s financial health. The agency conflicts embedded in the issuer
fee–based business model effectively reduce the efficiency of this insurance mechanism. As
a direct function of the increase in loan interest rates, CRAs are less likely to downgrade
borrowers, and they are slower to downgrade borrowers. We test whether well-informed
market participants (e.g., the initial lenders) internalize this conflict. We find that a one
3Bruno, Cornaggia, and Cornaggia (2016) show that Moody’s avoids downgrading issuers of corporate
bonds that are close to losing their investment grade certification. A likely explanation for our result is that
in PSD loans, investors benefit directly from downgrades through higher spreads. In contrast, the incentives
of borrowers and investors are aligned for bonds, because most bonds do not adjust their payment after a
downgrade.
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standard deviation increase in the average cost of downgrade is associated with a higher initial
loan interest spread of about 6 basis points (bp), a 5% increase relative to the unconditional
mean. This is consistent with lenders and borrowers being (to some extent) aware of these
conflicts of interests among CRAs and pricing them in the PSD market.
Next, we focus on the secondary market. Investors such as mutual funds and loan funds
tend to be less informed than banks. Thus, it is possible that many investors do not internal-
ize the conflicts of interest of CRAs. Consistent with this proposition, we find a significant
decrease in the yield premiums associated with high cost of downgrade loans one year after
loan origination. Moreover, this decrease in premiums persists through the remainder of the
loan’s life. In addition, we document that originating banks are more likely to sell loans
with high costs of downgrade, and that among the loans they sell, loans with high cost of
downgrade are sold faster.
Recently, CRAs had been accused of similar catering behavior in the market for RMBSs
and CDOs. This behavior contributed to the Financial Crisis (Griffin, 2019) and resulted in
important settlements between the two major CRAs and the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Importantly, the lawsuits brought by the DOJ and the subsequent settlements intended not
only to punish past misbehavior but also to improve future CRA conduct. In fact, as part of
their respective settlements, both CRAs renewed their commitment to credit rating quality
and affirmed the importance of credit ratings being impartial and not driven by business
concerns. We test whether the relationship between the probability of a downgrade and
the cost of a downgrade weakens after the settlement. We find no evidence of a weakened
relationship. Overall, this result suggests that the settlements did not have the intended
effect of improving credit rating quality and curbing CRA behavior, at least in the PSD
market.
This paper relates to a recent literature on CRA behavior in the market for securitized
products and its role in the Financial Crisis. Griffin and Tang (2012) show that CRAs
adjusted the ratings of securitized products to benefit clients at the expense of investors.
5
Griffin, Nickerson, and Tang (2013) show that CRAs inflated credit ratings beyond their
models when facing competition. He, Qian, and Strahan (2011, 2012) and Efing and Hau
(2015) show that CRAs issued increasingly optimistic credit ratings for asset-backed securi-
ties (ABSs) issued by large clients that provided them with more business. These positive
credit ratings benefitted CRAs’ clients through higher prices for their securities (Ashcraft
et al., 2011).4 Our paper shows that credit rating inflation is also a feature of the PSD
market, and credit rating inflation continued after CRAs settled with the government post-
Crisis.
This paper also relates to the literature that studies the conflicts of interest of CRAs more
generally. Opp, Opp, and Harris (2013) show that credit rating inflation can be induced by
regulatory reliance on the credit ratings themselves. Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009)
and Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) develop models in which reputation is not always
a sufficient deterrent to prevent CRAs from catering to clients. In the case of corporate
bonds, Becker and Milbourn (2011) show that increased competition from Fitch lowered
the credit rating quality of S&P and Moody’s.5 In our setting of PSD loans, prior work
compares firms with credit rating–based loans to firms with accounting ratio–based loans.
These papers show that firms with credit rating–based loans experience fewer credit rating
downgrades (Kraft, 2015) and more credit rating upgrades (Bannier and Wiemann, 2011).
While this result is consistent with CRA catering, it is not obvious that CRAs are at fault,
given the selection concerns described above. Our paper complements this work by showing
evidence of CRA catering in the PSD market after accounting for these selection concerns.
Furthermore, we show that this catering behavior remains prevalent post-Crisis, and that
lenders and borrowers are aware of the conflicts of interest of CRAs. In contrast, secondary
market participants seem to be less aware of these conflicts.
4Griffin (2019) provides a detailed overview of the literature on the behavior of the various participants
in the securitized product market during the run-up to the Financial Crisis.
5Cornaggia and Cornaggia (2013) show that issuer fee–based ratings for specific debt issues diverge from
the credit ratings paid by investors, while Xia (2014) shows that the latter can have a disciplining effect on
issuer fee–based ratings.
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Finally, this paper contributes to the literature that focuses on understanding the use and
the implications of PSD loans. Asquith, Beatty, and Weber (2005) show that PSD loans can
prevent agency conflicts and costly renegotiations. Manso, Strulovici, and Tchistyi (2010)
and Begley (2012) show that firms may use PSD loans to signal higher quality. Adam et al.
(2020) shows that managerial overconfidence affects the use of PSD loans, and Tchistyi,
Yermack, and Yun (2011) show that PSD loans allow managers to gain private benefits at
the expense of firm risk.6 Our paper shows that there are long-lasting consequences of the
use of PSD loans through their impact on the reliability of credit ratings. Importantly, this
impact extends beyond the initial decision of PSD loan issuance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the PSD market and
the incentives that drive CRAs. Section 2 describes the data, sample selection process,
and empirical framework. Section 3 shows that CRAs cater to their clients. Section 4
investigates whether the catering behavior of CRAs is priced in the primary and secondary
markets. Section 5 investigates whether CRAs improved their approach to credit ratings
post-settlements. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
1. Background
1.1. Performance-sensitive debt
Performance-sensitive debt (PSD) is a type of debt in which interest payments depend on
a measure of a borrower’s financial health (e.g., credit ratings, debt-to-cash flow ratio). The
idea behind this type of debt obligation is to delay the costly renegotiation that results from
borrowers triggering responses to covenant violations. In general, if a borrower’s financial
health deteriorates, the interest rate associated with the PSD obligation increases, thus
compensating the debt holder for the additional risk.
PSD contracts became common in the early 1990s. Now, the total size of the PSD
6Adam and Streitz (2016) show that PSD loans can be used to reduce hold-up problems, and Beatty and
Weber (2003) show that PSD loan contracts affect firms’ accounting choices. Mjøs, Myklebust, and Persson
(2013) show that PSD loans are priced to reflect the risk of shocks to the credit performance measure.
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market is over $2 trillion. In this paper, we focus on the $900 billion market in which
interest payments depend exclusively on credit ratings.
In PSD contracts, interest rates are contractually linked to measures of a borrower’s
financial health through a pricing grid. Figure 1 shows the pricing grid from The Walt
Disney Co.’s syndicated 5.25-year revolving credit facility issued on February 23, 2005. The
loan amount was $2.25 billion. The facility’s pricing grid indicates that The Walt Disney
Co. can be subject to pay five different interest rates, depending on its long-term senior
debt rating. For example, if the firm’s credit rating by S&P is AA- or better, then The
Walt Disney Co. is subject to an interest rate of 11.5 bp over the London Interbank Offered
Rate (LIBOR). If their credit rating is between A and A+, the interest rate increases to
13 bp over LIBOR. The highest interest rate that The Walt Disney Co. may be required
to pay under this facility is 30.0 bp over LIBOR, which is an increase triggered by a credit
rating deterioration to BBB- or worse. In this paper, we exploit heterogeneity in interest
rate changes following a credit rating downgrade.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
1.2. Credit rating agencies and conflicts of interest
The main role of CRAs is to perform a continual assessment of firms’ creditworthiness.
CRAs communicate these assessments to financial markets in the form of credit ratings.
Credit ratings are important for the rated firm because they affect the firm’s ability to
access capital through the value placed on them by investors, either for informational or
regulatory reasons. Importantly, it is not the investor who pays for the issuance of the credit
rating but rather the rated firm itself. This issuer fee–based business model of credit ratings
has been subject to extensive criticism because it can generate a conflict of interest that can
lead to CRAs catering to the firms that pay them.
In our setting of credit rating–based PSD loans, this conflict arises when a credit rating
downgrade by a CRA causes a change in the pricing schedule that increases the interest rate
8
paid by the borrower. For example, in the pricing grid from Figure 1, there is no change
in Disney’s borrowing costs (i.e., borrowing costs would remain 13 bp over LIBOR) if the
firm is downgraded from a credit rating of A+ to a credit rating of A. However, if the firm
is downgraded to A-, its borrowing costs would increase to 14 bp over LIBOR, or $225,000
a year. This number is about half the median annual cost of a downgrade in our sample
(i.e., $520,000). We hypothesize that, all else being equal, a CRA will be more reluctant
to downgrade a firm if the downgrade causes higher costs for the borrower. Moreover, the
misalignment of incentives should be even more severe when a CRA faces competition and
when its rating is the one that leads directly to an increase in borrowing costs.
Credit ratings are supposed to be an objective and high-quality assessment of borrower
creditworthiness. CRAs claim to meet the highest standards of integrity, independence,
objectivity, and transparency (Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis, 2002). CRAs
are aware that credit ratings can negatively affect borrowers’ funding costs (Moody’s, 2002).
However, CRAs’ guidelines are clear in that credit ratings are issued independently of the
effect that they may have on the borrower (Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis,
2002; S&P Global Ratings, 2018). Similarly, CRAs acknowledge the conflicts of interest that
arise from the issuer fee–based business model (Department of Justice, 2015, 2017). However,
fear of diminished reputation and regulatory penalties are often thought to mitigate these
conflicts. Internet Appendix C includes excerpts from CRA documents, regulator documents,
congressional hearings, DOJ press releases, and settlement statements of facts discussing
these issues.
CRAs catered to underwriting banks by inflating the credit ratings associated with
RMBSs and CDOs, making them important contributors to the Financial Crisis (Griffin
et al., 2013; Griffin, 2019). Recently, both S&P and Moody’s agreed to settlements with
the DOJ in which they (a) explicitly acknowledged failing to adhere to their own standards
when rating securitized products and (b) renewed their commitment to credit rating quality
(see Internet Appendix C).
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The catering behavior of CRAs during the run-up to the Financial Crisis has partly been
attributed to the complexity of securitized products (Griffin, 2019). In this paper, we study
whether the conflicts of interest affecting CRAs prevail in other less complex markets, such
as the PSD market. While the lower complexity of these financial products could reduce the
scope for CRAs to inflate ratings, the continuous nature of credit ratings and their small
measurement increments could facilitate it. Importantly, pricing data are more reliable and
available for PSD loans than for RMBSs and CDOs, which makes the PSD setting ideal
for studying whether market participants recognize and internalize the conflicts of interest,
both at origination and in the secondary market. Finally, we also study whether the DOJ
settlements were effective in holding CRAs to their renewed commitment to credit rating
quality, a question that cannot be answered by studying the RMBS and CDO markets
because those markets disappeared before the settlements.
2. Data, sample selection, and empirical framework
2.1. Primary data
We obtain data on loan performance pricing (i.e., pricing grids) from LPC DealScan.
Recall that we focus on loans with performance provisions that depend exclusively on senior
credit ratings. To identify where borrowers stand in the pricing grid, we assign to each loan
the corresponding borrower’s long-term senior unsecured credit rating from Bloomberg.7 We
consider the credit ratings issued by S&P and Moody’s. Following Tchistyi, Yermack, and
Yun (2011), for cases in which borrowers have received credit ratings from both CRAs, we
consider the better of the two ratings as relevant for pricing purposes.
We then use the pricing grids to assign each loan in each quarter the current interest
spread and the interest spread that would prevail after a credit rating downgrade. Some
contracts give borrowers a choice between different types of reference rates for determining
7DealScan does not generally specify whether the relevant senior credit rating is that of unsecured or
secured debt. However, DealScan sometimes provides separate comments regarding this issue. In about 75%
of the roughly 8,700 comments that include the word rating, there is a reference to unsecured credit ratings.
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interest spreads (e.g., LIBOR, the bank’s prime rate). Since interest spreads over LIBOR
are by far the most common, we use this market rate as our baseline measure for interest
spreads.8 We use cost of downgrade to refer to the difference between the spread at the
prevailing credit rating and the spread at the credit rating one notch below it.
2.2. Secondary data and final sample
Initially, we obtain pricing grid data for 31,005 facilities originated between 2000 and
2016. We link these facilities to Compustat using the latest DealScan–Compustat linking
table (Chava and Roberts, 2008), which leaves 27,141 loans. We then require all relevant
loan and firm information to be nonmissing, which leaves 3,700 loans. Of these loans, 2,075
have pricing grids that depend exclusively on credit ratings. Finally, we require loans to have
credit ratings issued by S&P or Moody’s.9 The final sample consists of 1,829 loans spanning
20,725 loan–quarter observations.10
Panels A and B of Table 1 describe the final sample. The mean increase in borrowing costs
following a one-notch downgrade is 13.3 bp, with an interdecile range of 25 bp. Downgrades
are a rare event: The likelihood of a borrower being downgraded in a given quarter is, on
average, only 2.9%. The median credit rating throughout the sample is BBB.11 The average
loan size is $886.7 million. Finally, conditional on being downgraded, the average borrower
is downgraded within four quarters of issuing a loan.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
8The same approach is taken by, for example, Tchistyi et al. (2011).
9Compustat does not provide credit ratings issued by Moody’s, so we consider the credit ratings from
both CRAs (provided by Bloomberg) for consistency.
10For a subset of our analysis, we merge the final sample with secondary market loan pricing data from
Refinitiv’s Loan Pricing Corporation. We describe these data and the merging process in Section 4.2 and
Internet Appendix A.
11Internet Appendix Figure IA.1 shows the distribution of credit ratings at origination.
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2.3. Empirical framework
Pricing grids vary within loan contracts (and therefore the change in borrowing costs
associated with a credit rating downgrade also varies). Thus, to study whether the conflicts
of interests of CRAs affect the credit ratings they issue, we estimate specifications of the
form
1(downgrade)i,t = β1cost of downgradei,l,t +X
′
i,l,tΓ + ǫi,l,t, (1)
where 1(downgrade)i,t is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if borrower i is downgraded
in quarter t, and 0 otherwise. The independent variable of interest is cost of downgradei,l,t,
a measure of the increase in the loan spread that would result from a one-increment credit
rating downgrade for loan l in quarter t. Thus, this variable captures the time-varying
degree of the CRAs’ conflicts of interest for each loan. The higher the increase in a firm’s
borrowing costs following a one-notch downgrade, the stronger the incentive for the CRA
to avoid the downgrade.12 The variable XI,l,t is a vector of time-varying loan- and firm-
level characteristics and fixed effects. In secondary tests, we also estimate specifications in
which the dependent variable is the time interval in which the firm is downgraded after loan
origination.
Identifying conflicts of interest in PSD is challenging for multiple reasons. First, firms
could self-select into PSD either because they have inside information (Begley, 2012) or
because they are overly optimistic (Adam et al., 2020). Even within PSD contracts, a
näıve comparison of the probability of a downgrade between firms that selected into ratings-
based PSD and those that did not is likely to be biased, with the former set of firms being
downgraded less frequently.13 Second, there is another type of selection often referred to as
12While most downgrades occur in single increments, some downgrades are larger. For example, the aver-
age number of downgrade increments was 1.37, conditional on a downgrade from S&P in 2018 (S&P Global
Ratings, 2019). In the Internet Appendix, we show that our regression results are robust to constructing the
variable for the costs of a downgrade based on two-increment downgrades.
13Kraft (2015) and Bannier and Wiemann (2011) compare firms with credit rating–based loans to firms
with accounting ratio–based loans, and they show that firms with credit rating–based loans experience fewer
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rating shopping. A firm may approach a number of CRAs and then choose to do business
with the agency that offers the most positive credit rating.14 As a result, credit ratings are
overly optimistic due to the unintentional errors inherent in the credit rating process rather
than CRAs yielding to conflicts of interest.
Our empirical setting allows us to mitigate both of these selection concerns. Since both
selection concerns are borrower specific, we include borrower (i.e., firm) fixed effects in
all specifications, effectively exploiting within-borrower variation in the impact of a credit
rating downgrade on loan spreads. However, other variables likely correlated with downgrade
likelihood (e.g., borrower quality, managerial optimism) are time varying, so they are not
accounted for by the borrower fixed effects. Thus, we include time-varying variables of
financial health in Xi,l,t, such as the firm’s current credit rating, size (measured by the log
of total assets), profitability, asset tangibility, and leverage. In robustness tests, we estimate
an even more stringent specification that includes loan fixed effects.15
In addition, since the probability of a credit rating downgrade varies with the business
cycle (Bar-Isaac and Shapiro, 2013), Xi,l,t also includes year fixed effects. Finally, the various
dimensions of loan contracts are jointly determined at origination. Thus, we include loan-
level control variables for loan type, loan amount, the number of financial covenants, whether
the loan is secured, and deal purpose.
2.4. Sources of variation
In our most stringent specification, we include fixed effects for the current credit rating,
borrower, and year. Thus, we exploit variation in credit rating downgrade probabilities and
credit rating downgrades and more credit rating upgrades, respectively. Internet Appendix, Table IA.1,
shows that firms with credit rating–based PSD loans and firms with accounting ratio–based PSD loans differ
significantly in terms of observable characteristics.
14Skreta and Veldkamp (2009), Faure-Grimaud, Peyrache, and Quesada (2009), and Sangiorgi and Spatt
(2017) provide theories of rating shopping. Kronlund (2019) shows empirical evidence of rating shopping
in corporate bonds. Benmelech and Dlugosz (2010) show evidence consistent with rating shopping in ABS
CDOs.
15There are 471 firms in our sample. Of these firms, 18 have one credit rating–based PSD loan. In these
cases, the regression specifications exploit within-loan variation with the inclusion of borrower fixed effects.
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in borrowing costs following a one-notch downgrade from three separate sources. That is,
we exploit variation in these variables (a) across loans and across time within credit ratings,
(b) across loans and across time within borrower, and (c) across loans within time. In this
section, we show that, even with these tight sets of fixed effects, there is enough variation in
the data to identify the effects of CRAs’ conflicts of interest in PSD.
Panel C of Table 1 shows within-group standard deviations of the dependent and in-
dependent variables that are most relevant to our regressions. The within–credit rating
standard deviation of 1(downgrade) is 16.6 percentage points (pp), which is very similar
to its overall standard deviation of 16.9 pp. Similarly, the within–credit rating standard
deviation of cost of downgrade is 10.7 bp (compared to 11.9 bp overall). The time required
for the firm to be downgraded follows the same pattern. The panel also shows a significant
variation in the previous three variables within firm and within year. Overall, there is more
than sufficient variation in the data to expect that our specifications will have power.
3. Credit rating agency behavior and the cost of downgrades
We start by investigating whether CRAs are less likely to downgrade their clients when
the downgrade is potentially more costly. Next, we refine our identification strategy by
contrasting (a) instances in which credit rating downgrades would directly cause a change in
a firm’s borrowing costs with (b) instances in which credit rating downgrades are irrelevant.
We then explore additional possible explanations for our main result. Finally, for loans from
firms that experience a downgrade, we study the effect of the variable that represents the
costs of a downgrade on a different outcome variable, namely the time interval from loan
origination to the eventual downgrade.
3.1. Probability of downgrades
Table 2 presents the results from estimating different variants of Equation (1). Recall that
the dependent variable is 1(downgrade), which indicates whether a borrower is downgraded
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by a CRA in a given quarter. The independent variable of interest is cost of downgrade,
a variable that measures a firm’s increase in borrowing costs following a one-notch down-
grade. For ease of exposition, 1(downgrade) is multiplied by 100, and cost of downgrade is
standardized so that the coefficients represent the effect (in percentage points) on the prob-
ability of a downgrade associated with changing the cost variable by one standard deviation.
Standard errors are clustered at the borrower (i.e., the firm) level.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Column (1) of Table 2 presents the results from our most basic specification, which
includes only firm and year fixed effects. The point estimate on cost of downgrade is −0.79,
indicating that a one standard deviation increase in borrowing costs in the eventuality of a
one-notch downgrade decreases the quarterly downgrade likelihood by almost 0.8 pp. This
effect is statistically significant at the 1% level and is economically important: It represents
a 27% decrease relative to the sample mean quarterly downgrade likelihood of 2.93%.
The previous specification presents initial evidence that CRAs are more reluctant to
downgrade the credit ratings of borrowers who are the most likely to be negatively affected.
However, one remaining concern is that the various features of loan contracts are determined
at origination, and these features could correlate with the likelihood of future downgrades. In
particular, borrower creditworthiness at origination certainly influences loan contract terms.
To address this concern, Column (2) adds controls for loan-level characteristics such as loan
amount, loan type, the number of financial covenants, and deal purpose. Moreover, the
specification also includes credit rating fixed effects that capture the average probability of a
downgrade at each credit rating level. The coefficient of cost of downgrade changes slightly
to −0.86 pp.
Another remaining concern is that borrower quality is time variant and therefore not
accounted for by the firm fixed effects. Thus, to mitigate this concern, Columns (3) and (4)
include firm-level control variables that capture a borrower’s time-varying ability to repay.
Specifically, the specifications include firm size (i.e., log of assets), leverage, profitability
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(i.e., return on assets), and asset tangibility (i.e., intangibles divided by assets). In Column
(3), we replace the loan-level controls with the firm-level controls. The point estimate on
cost of downgrade is −0.75 pp. Finally, Column (4) presents our most complete specifi-
cation, which includes the full set of fixed effects and control variables. The coefficient of
cost of downgrade is −0.83 pp, statistically significant at the 1% level. Overall, the results
in Table 2 show that CRAs are significantly less likely to downgrade their clients when the
downgrade is more costly to the client.
In the Internet Appendix, we present a series of robustness checks for the previous re-
sults. Table IA.2 shows that the point estimates in Table 2 remain unchanged after the
inclusion of year–quarter fixed effects. Similarly, Table IA.3 shows that the point estimates
on cost of downgrade range from -1.89 pp to -1.72 pp when estimating a much more strin-
gent specification that includes loan fixed effects instead of firm fixed effects. Tables IA.4
and IA.5 show that the main results are robust to alternative constructs of the variable for
the costs of a downgrade. Specifically, these alternate constructs are (a) constructing the
variable based on two-notch downgrades (instead of one notch) and (b) constructing the
variable as a dollar cost divided by assets. In Table IA.6, we analyze the firms rated by
S&P and Moody’s separately, and we find similar regression coefficients as Table 2 in both
samples.16 Finally, in Table IA.7, we conduct a placebo test using a sample of accounting
ratio–based PSD loans, and we find that the steepness of the pricing grid is not associated
with a higher probability of a credit rating downgrade for these loans.
3.2. Decisive credit ratings
In this section, we further sharpen our identification strategy by exploiting variation in
the CRAs that issue the decisive credit rating (i.e., the credit rating that causes the change
in the firm’s borrowing costs). This occurs in two instances: (a) when a borrower is rated
16While point estimates for the Moody’s sample are significant at the 10% level, their size is essentially
the same as in Table 2. The decreased statistical significance is driven mostly by lower Moody’s credit rating
coverage, which translates into a decrease of 74% in sample size compared to the full sample.
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solely by a single CRA and (b) when a borrower is rated by two CRAs that do not issue
the same credit rating. In this latter case, we follow Tchistyi et al. (2011) and consider the
higher of the two ratings as the decisive one.
If conflicts of interest affect the downgrade decisions of CRAs, then the decrease in down-
grade likelihood that occurs when downgrades are more costly to clients should concentrate
when the credit rating is the decisive one. To investigate this idea, we introduce the indicator
variable 1(decisive rating), which takes the value 1 when the CRA is either the only CRA
providing a rating or the CRA that issued the more positive rating, and 0 otherwise. We
supplement our main specification with this variable as well as with the interaction of this
variable and cost of downgrade.
The estimation results are presented in Table 3. Specifically, Columns (1) and (2) show
the results when S&P is the decisive CRA, and Columns (3) and (4) show the results when
Moody’s is the decisive CRA. The results are very similar across specifications. For ex-
ample, the more stringent specification for when S&P is the decisive CRA (Column (2))
shows a statistically insignificant point estimate on the standalone variable for the cost of
a downgrade of 0.12 pp. This indicates that when Moody’s is the decisive CRA, S&P’s
propensity to downgrade their client is unaffected by the magnitude of the potential increase
in borrowing costs. On the other hand, the coefficient estimate on the interaction term is
−1.01 pp (statistically significant at the 5% level), which indicates that S&P is especially
hesitant to downgrade their clients when their rating would be responsible for the increase
in borrowing costs. Table 3 shows that the same is true for Moody’s, with the coefficient on
cost of downgrade× 1(decisive rating) being −0.85 pp (Column (4)).
[Insert Table 3 here]
Overall, the previous results indicate that CRAs are more hesitant to downgrade the
credit ratings of their clients only when the CRA’s rating is the decisive one in determining
borrowing costs. The fixed effects employed in these regressions imply that they estimate
the difference in the behavior of the CRA when the CRA rates the same borrower over
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time, at the same current rating, with the sole difference being whether the CRA’s rating
is decisive. An additional test shown in Internet Appendix Table IA.8 goes further and
includes CRA×firm fixed effects, effectively absorbing the average downgrade propensity of
the agency with respect to each specific borrower. The results in Table 3 remain unchanged.
3.3. Alternative explanations
Our evidence indicates that CRAs are significantly less likely to downgrade the credit
rating of their clients when the downgrade is more costly to the client. This result is con-
sistent with the proposition that CRAs yield to the conflicts of interest that result from the
issuer fee–based business model of credit ratings. This interpretation is further supported by
the fact that the previous result is driven by those instances in which the CRA is the decisive
one for the determination of the borrowing costs. In this section, we address a number of
potential challenges to our interpretation of the results.
3.3.1 Undisclosed firm information
A first potential challenge to our interpretation of the results is that the results could be
driven by firms hiding negative financial information from the CRAs rather than by CRAs
catering to their clients. CRAs issue credit ratings based on information provided by a
borrower, and they do not verify this information (see Internet Appendix C). Firms whose
borrowing costs would experience the highest interest rate increase in the eventuality of a
credit rating downgrade have the strongest incentive to hide detrimental information, which
could explain why CRAs are less likely to downgrade firms when the downgrade is potentially
more costly.
To address this concern, we undertake two different approaches. First, we exploit an
observable negative shock to the creditworthiness of a subset of the firms in our sample.
Specifically, between the third quarter of 2014 and the end of 2015, commodities experi-
enced a dramatic loss in value, with the Dow Jones Commodity Index plummeting by 50%.
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Arguably, this loss negatively affected firms that depended on commodity values to generate
profits, such as firms from the oil, gas, and mining sectors. Consistent with this proposi-
tion, there was significant public concern about the prospects of these affected firms during
this time.17 The idea of this test is to compare the CRAs’ behavior when they rate firms
that were affected by the commodity shock (which the public saw as deteriorated) with the
CRAs’ behavior when rating the remaining, unaffected firms. Since the shock was visible
and highly public, the ability of borrowers in the affected sectors to hide adverse information
was particularly low. If our results are driven by firms hiding information, we should see
a weaker link between the cost of a downgrade and the likelihood of a downgrade among
borrowers in the affected sectors during this downturn.18
In Table 4, we supplement our main specification with an indicator variable for firms
in industry sectors that depend on commodity values (1(commodities)), an indicator vari-
able that captures the time when commodity values fell (1(commodities shock)), and the
interaction of these indicators with cost of downgrade.19 The coefficient on the standalone
cost of downgrade remains statistically significant and similar in magnitude to the esti-
mates in Table 2 in all specifications. Consistent with falling commodity values adversely
affecting borrowers, the coefficient on 1(commodities) × 1(commodities shock) is always
positive and statistically significant, ranging from 3.4–6.4 pp. However, the coefficient on
the triple interaction ranges from −4.9–−4.6 pp (always statistically significant), indicating
that downgrades were concentrated among borrowers for whom the cost of a downgrade is
lower. Since all market participants were well aware of these commodities setbacks, these
results are inconsistent with the idea that our main results are driven by firms hiding nega-
17See, for example, Egan (2015), “Copper, aluminum and steel collapse to crisis levels,” CNN, December
9.
18In contrast, if our results are driven by rating catering, results should be particularly strong within the
affected sectors, since there was an unusually strong pressure to downgrade. In fact, our sample shows 16
downgrades of firms in the affected sectors during the time of the shock, but it shows no downgrades from
2002 to early 2014.
19Specifically, we assign a value of 1 to 1(commodities) for firms in the following sectors: (1) oil and gas
extraction, (2) coal mining, (3) metal ore mining, and (4) support activities for mining (i.e., NAICS codes
2111, 2121, 2122, and 2131). We also assign a value of 1 to 1(commodities shock) for the quarters 2014Q3
to 2015Q4.
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tive financial information. In contrast, these results are consistent with conflicts of interest.
In Internet Appendix, Table IA.9, we consider the possibility that CRAs lower ratings with
a lag, and we extend 1(commodities shock) to include 2016. The results in Table 4 remain
unchanged.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Second, we exploit cross-sectional differences in the ease with which firms can hide or
manipulate financial information. Specifically, the idea of this test is to compare (a) the
CRAs’ behavior when rating firms that are relatively more opaque in nature (i.e., firms that
have more room to manipulate their financials) to (b) the CRAs’ behavior when rating the
remaining, less opaque firms.
We use a firm’s intangibles divided by total assets and a firm’s research and development
(R&D) expenses as proxies for a firm’s “opaqueness” (Wyatt, 2005; Cañibano et al., 2000).20
In Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, we supplement our main specification with indicator
variables for above-median values of these proxy variables, as well as with the interaction
between these indicators and cost of downgrade. While the coefficient on the standalone
cost of downgrade remains statistically significant and similar in magnitude to the esti-
mates in Table 2 in both columns, the coefficients on both interaction terms are statistically
insignificant.21 Overall, these results are inconsistent with the proposition that our main
results are driven by firms hiding negative financial information from the CRAs.
[Insert Table 5 here]
3.3.2 Avoidance of non-investment grade classification
A second potential challenge to our interpretation of the results is that they could be
driven by regulatory restrictions on investors that prevent them from investing in non-
20Firms with significant intangibles have discretion in determining asset provisions such as goodwill.
Likewise, firms have significant flexibility when classifying R&D expenditures.
21In the Internet Appendix, Table IA.10, we show that these results remain unchanged when interacting
cost of downgrade with continuous versions of the proxies for firm opaqueness.
20
investment grade securities. Thus, CRAs could be less likely to downgrade a client if the
credit rating downgrade would change their client’s classification from investment grade to
non-investment grade, resulting not only in increased borrowing costs and a lower future
availability of funding for borrowers but also reduced investment opportunities for investors.
CRAs’ guidelines are clear: Credit ratings should be issued independently of the effect that
they may have on the borrower (see Internet Appendix C). However, when a firm is on the
border of a non-investment grade classification, CRAs may have the implicit consent of in-
vestors to avoid downgrading (Bruno et al., 2016). Moreover, since the increase in borrowing
costs of PSD contracts is particularly steep at the investment grade threshold (Figure IA.2),
our point estimates could be driven by these subset of loans.
To investigate this possibility, we introduce the indicator variable 1(border junk), which
takes the value 1 when the borrower has a credit rating of BBB- (i.e., just above non-
investment grade), and 0 otherwise. As before, we supplement our main specification with
this variable as well as with the interaction between this variable and cost of downgrade. We
report the results in Column (3) of Table 5. Consistent with CRAs being particularly hesitant
to downgrade their clients to non-investment grade, the point estimate on the interaction
term is −0.43 pp, but it is statistically insignificant. In contrast, the point estimate on
cost of downgrade is −0.69 pp. This result is statistically significant at the 1% level and
very similar to the point estimates shown in Table 2.22 Overall, Column (3) of Table 5
indicates that CRAs are hesitant to downgrade their clients when the costs of doing so are
higher across the whole spectrum of ratings, not just close to the non-investment grade
classification.
Note that the previous result is consistent with our PSD loan setting differing from the
bond setting in Bruno et al. (2016) in one important aspect: In PSD loans, investors benefit
directly from downgrades through higher spreads, potentially offsetting other benefits of
delaying downgrades. For bonds, however, the incentives of borrowers and investors are
22In the Internet Appendix, Table IA.11, we show that this result is robust to alternative definitions of
1(border junk).
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aligned because bonds do not adjust their payments based on downgrades.
3.4. Time to downgrade
The previous results indicate that CRAs are less likely to downgrade their clients at times
when the downgrade is more costly. A lower probability of downgrade can be explained by
CRAs either being slower to downgrade or avoiding downgrades entirely. Next, we investigate
whether, conditional on downgrading, CRAs are slower to downgrade their clients when the
downgrade is more costly.
Table 6 estimates specifications similar to those in Table 2, with the main difference
being that the dependent variable is time to downgrade, which represents the number of
quarters between origination and the eventual downgrade.23 As before, the variable for the
cost of downgrade is standardized, and standard errors are clustered by firm.
[Insert Table 6 here]
The coefficient on cost of downgrade in Column (1) is 1.14 quarters (statistically signifi-
cant at the 5% level). This indicates that a one standard deviation increase in the borrowing
costs following a one-notch downgrade is associated with 102 additional days (1.14×90) be-
fore the borrower is downgraded by a CRA. This is an economically important effect that
represents a 22% increase in the time to downgrade compared to the sample mean time to
downgrade of 5.08 quarters.
Columns (2) to (4) incorporate loan- and firm-level controls, as well as firm, year, and
credit rating at origination fixed effects. The coefficient on cost of downgrade ranges from
1.23–2.20 quarters. In particular, the coefficient of 2.20 in the most stringent specifica-
tion (Column (4)) equals an increase of 198 days (or a 43% increase relative to the mean
time to downgrade) in the deferral of a downgrade. To give this result additional con-
text, our sample shows an average downgrade size of 1.3 increments, an average cost per
23We limit our sample to a single observation per loan, and we consider only the loans of firms that
experience a downgrade within the loan’s maturity. In the case of multiple downgrades, we consider only the
first downgrade for each loan (i.e., we consider the time from loan origination to the eventual downgrade).
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downgrade notch of 13 bp, and an average loan size of $886 million. Thus, 2.2 additional
quarters without a credit rating downgrade translates to almost $650,000 in borrower savings
(886m×0.0013×2.2/4=0.633m).
Note that one limitation of the analysis in Table 6 is that we are making inferences from
a limited number of observations. First, the regressions are at the loan level rather than at
the loan–quarter level. Second, the inclusion of firm fixed effects limits us to borrowers that
both issue multiple loans and are downgraded during the time in which the loans are still
outstanding.24
3.5. Survival analysis
In this section, we complement our previous analysis by conducting a nonparametric
survival analysis that specifically models the hazard rate of credit rating downgrades (Collett,
2015). This approach relies on the Kaplan–Meier survival curve, which plots the percentage
of the sample that has not yet experienced failure over time (i.e., the survival rate).25 We
define failure as the occurrence of a credit rating downgrade. Figure 2 compares the survival
rate of PSD loans with a high (i.e., above-median) downgrade cost at origination to the
survival rate of PSD loans with a low (i.e., below-median) downgrade cost at origination.26
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Figure 2 shows that firms with loans that have a high downgrade cost are significantly
less likely to be downgraded by CRAs than firms with loans that have a low downgrade
cost. This result holds for all time horizons. For example, after eight quarters (i.e., two
24There are a total of 451 loans that are associated with a downgrade. This corresponds to about one
quarter of the 1,829 loans in our sample. In untabulated results, we find that in simple OLS regressions with
no controls in this larger sample, the coefficient estimate on cost of downgrade is 1.3 quarters (statistically
significant at the 5% level). This is very similar to the estimates in Table 6.
25The Kaplan–Meier estimator is a nonparametric estimator of survival rates that takes into account right
censoring. Other applications in finance include Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006), Deyoung et al. (2015),
and Malmendier, Opp, and Saidi (2016).
26We restrict the analysis to the first five years of each loan’s life. Over 90% of the loans in our sample
have a maturity of five years or less.
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years), 15% of firms with high–downgrade cost loans experience a downgrade. In contrast,
the corresponding failure rate for firms with low–downgrade cost loans is almost 25%.
This survival analysis approach also allows us to estimate the expected time before a
downgrade for each group.27 The expected time to downgrade for firms with low–downgrade
cost loans is 15 quarters (95% confidence interval is 14.5–15.5), while the expected time
before a downgrade for firms with high–downgrade cost loans is 17.1 quarters (95% confidence
interval is 16.7–17.6). Thus, the difference in survival times between the two groups is 2.1
quarters, and the difference in the cost of a downgrade is 15.36 bp. Note that the magnitudes
of these nonparametric estimates are very similar to those of our most saturated model shown
in Table 6. In that model, we estimate that a one standard deviation increase in the cost of
a downgrade variable (11.89 bp) increases the time before a downgrade by 2.20 quarters.
4. Loan pricing and the cost of downgrades
If CRAs are less likely (or slower) to downgrade a borrower when the costs of doing so are
higher for the borrower, loan pricing grids are less effective at compensating the lenders (i.e.,
investors) for a deterioration in the borrower’s financial health. This may affect loan pricing
at the time of loan origination if primary market participants are aware of this problem.
Loan contracts that are more affected by the conflicts of interest of CRAs by way of steeper
pricing grids should be priced at a discount compared to similar loans with fewer potential
agency issues. On the other hand, secondary market participants such as collateralized loan
obligation investors or pension funds are arguably less informed than banks in regard to
these loan contracts. In this section, we test if agency conflicts stemming from performance
sensitive debt are priced in the primary and secondary markets.
27These values are obtained by calculating the area under the Kaplan–Meier survival curves in Figure 2.
Confidence intervals are calculated following Collett (2015).
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4.1. Loan pricing and the cost of downgrades in the primary market
We investigate the relationship between loan spreads and pricing grid design at origina-
tion. We introduce the variable average cost of downgrade, which represents the average
cost of a one-notch downgrade during the lifetime of a loan. Thus, this variable is a measure
of the ex post (i.e., realized) conflicts of interests of CRAs over the life of a loan, as opposed
to a measure of the ex ante (i.e., expected) conflicts of interest of CRAs that would be
captured by the average steepness of the pricing grid.28 Table 7 shows the results of regres-
sions in which the dependent variable is the loan’s interest rate spread at origination and
the independent variable of interest is average cost of downgrade. As in previous analyses,
the variable is standardized, and standard errors are clustered by firm. We retain only one
observation per loan (i.e., at origination). Importantly, while the four specifications in Table
7 vary in terms of control variables and fixed effects, they all include firm fixed effects. Thus,
the estimations effectively compare loan contracts with different pricing grids by the same
borrower.
[Insert Table 7 here]
The point estimates on average cost of downgrade are positive and statistically signifi-
cant at the 1% level in the four specifications, ranging from 6.7–10.1 bp. Thus, the regression
results are consistent with borrowers and lenders being aware of and pricing the conflicts of
interest of CRAs.
The previous result can seem somewhat surprising at first, since it indicates that, all else
being equal, a steeper pricing grid is detrimental to the borrower (i.e., borrowing costs are
higher at origination). Since interest rates increase when the borrower is downgraded, PSD
loans effectively embed an insurance mechanism for the lender against the deterioration
of the borrower’s financial health. If the pricing grid is steeper, the insurance payment
28In the Internet Appendix (Table IA.12), we show that this analysis is robust even when considering the
latter measure of conflicts of interest.
25
is higher. Intuitively, a loan with a larger premium should be cheaper for the borrower,
not more expensive. However, the previous result can be understood in the context of
our analysis. Our analysis compares only loans that have a pricing grid to begin with.
Specifically, our regressions compare loan spreads across loans that have pricing grids of
varying steepness, and the coefficient estimates reflect the decreasing relative efficiency of
pricing grids. Compared to a very small increase in interest rates for downgrades, a large
increase in interest rates after downgrades is less efficient, since, as the results in Section 3
indicate, CRAs are more reluctant to downgrade their clients when the costs of a downgrade
are higher.
4.2. Loan pricing and the cost of downgrades in the secondary market
The trading of loans in the secondary market has increased substantially in recent years
(Beyhaghi and Ehsani, 2017).29 One concern with these trades is that originating banks
may have an advantage over investors in the secondary market because they have superior
information regarding loan quality (Dahiya et al., 2003). While some investors are well-
informed and even have access to insider information (Addoum and Murfin, 2020), many,
such as mutual funds and loan funds, are non-bank investors (who tend to be less informed).
Previously, we showed that the potential for credit inflation is, to some extent, priced at
origination. We now investigate whether this pricing of the potential for credit inflation
persists once loans are traded in the secondary market.
We obtain secondary market loan pricing data from Refinitiv’s Loan Pricing Corporation
(LPC). The secondary market data consists of self-reported information from brokers that
quote daily prices on loans. While a quote does not guarantee a trade, brokers tend to make
markets for more liquid loans, and any loan in the LPC database is almost surely traded at
some point.30 We match these data to our sample of PSD loans using a proprietary linking
29Among the possible reasons for this increase are the “originate to distribute” model (Ivashina and
Scharfstein, 2010) and increased regulatory pressure on banks to increase capital ratios and reduce risk
(Pierret and Steri, 2019).
30In fact, the main purpose of LPC is to “facilitate trading and investment decisions” (https://www.
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table provided by Refinitiv. The Refinitiv linking table matches 4.1% of the loans in our
sample (i.e. 75 loans) to the secondary market data. While this matching rate may seem
low, it is similar to the 4.9% matching rate that we find for all loans in DealScan and to the
matching rate reported by other research using similar data.31 Internet Appendix A provides
a detailed description of the matching procedure.
We construct a quarterly panel with quoted prices for the traded loans in our sample.
Similar to the analysis in Figure 2, we compare the prices of PSD loans with high (i.e.,
above-median) downgrade cost at origination to the prices of PSD loans with low (i.e.,
below-median) downgrade cost at origination. Specifically, we estimate a regression where
the dependent variable is loan price (measured as the average of the mid-prices quoted each
quarter) and the independent variables of interest are the interactions of an indicator for
above-median cost of downgrade and indicators for each quarter since loan issuance. The
regression includes the same set of control variables and fixed effects as in Column (4) of
Table 2 (i.e., our most stringent specification) plus loan fixed effects, and we consider the
first four years of each loan’s lifetime.32
Figure 3 shows the coefficients for each quarterly interaction along with their corre-
sponding 95% confidence interval based on standard errors clustered by loan. We use the
first quarter’s as our coefficient of reference. Thus, since each interaction coefficient captures
the average difference in price between PSD loans with high cost of downgrade and PSD
loans with low cost of downgrade, a positive coefficient in a given quarter means that the
differences in prices between the two groups of loans increased in that quarter relative to the
difference that prevailed in the first quarter. Note that an increase in price is equivalent to a
decrease in yield. Thus, a positive coefficient implies a decrease in the initial yield premium
lsta.org/members/lpc-from-refinitiv/).
31Wittenberg-Moerman (2008) matches about 7% of U.S. syndicated loans and Pierret and Steri (2019)
matches about 6% of loans in DealScan. Altman, Gande, and Saunders (2010) find 80 firms with bonds and
loans with secondary market pricing data. Billett et al. (2015) match loans from 156 firms among firms from
COMPUSTAT that do share repurchases. Gande and Saunders (2012) find 314 borrowers with a first-time
traded loan.
32We require at least 10 traded loan facilities each quarter. After four years from origination, there are
only nine loans left with available secondary market prices, which limits statistical power.
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associated with loans that have a high cost of downgrade.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
The figure shows that there is no change in price differences between high and low cost of
downgrade loans in the first three quarters after loan origination. Coincidently, the average
time from origination to first sale for loans with above-median cost of downgrade is 100
days (denoted by the dashed vertical line in the figure). From the fourth quarter onwards
the coefficient estimates turn positive, consistent with a decrease in the premium associated
with high cost of downgrade loans. In fact, on average, these loans become about 2% more
expensive than low cost of downgrade loans after three years. Overall, the point estimates in
Figure 3 are consistent with secondary market participants overpaying for above-median cost
of downgrade loans (and therefore pricing less of the conflicts of interest of CRAs) relative
to originating banks.
4.3. Probability of trade and time to first trade
To complement the previous analysis, we also study whether there is a relationship be-
tween a loan’s cost of downgrade, its probability of being traded, and the speed at which it is
first traded. We continue to focus on the 75 loans in our sample for which we have secondary
market pricing data. Since this sample is relatively small and the nature of this analysis is
cross-sectional, we lack the additional observations provided by the quarterly-panel structure
from the previous section. Consequently, we display the results graphically.
We begin by investigating whether banks are more likely to sell loans with higher CRA
conflicts. To facilitate the comparison between loans that are traded and loans that are
not traded, we match the 75 loans with similar non-traded loans using a nearest neighbor
matching technique based on all continuous control variables.33 We then split these 150
33These variables include firm characteristics (current credit rating, size, profitability, asset tangibility,
and leverage) and loan characteristics (amount, number of financial covenants, and whether the loan is
secured or not). Table IA.13 shows that the matching is successful in finding observationally equivalent
loans to the traded loans among the non-traded loans.
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observations into three groups based on their cost of downgrade, and plot the probability of
a loan being sold by the originating bank for each group in Figure 4.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
The figure shows a nonlinear relationship between our measure of CRA conflicts and the
likelihood of a loan being traded. Loans in the highest group of cost of downgrade have a
56% probability of being traded in the secondary market, 10% higher than that of the other
two groups with lower downgrade costs.
Next, we investigate whether banks, conditionally on selling a loan, are selling loans with
higher CRA conflicts faster. The underlying assumption for this analysis is that originating
banks sell parts of the loan on the same day a dealer quotes a price for the loan for the
first time. Thus, we compare the time elapsed between loan origination and when the loan
gets quoted for the first time across groups of loans based on costs of downgrade. As before,
we split the sample into three groups based on cost of downgrade and plot the average
time-to-first-trade for each group in Figure 5.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
Once again, the figure shows a nonlinear relationship between our measure of CRA con-
flicts and the outcome variable. Loans in the lowest group of cost of downgrade stay on banks’
balance sheets for 450 days before getting quoted, whereas loans in the other two groups
experience their first quote after about 200 days, on average. This is a 150-day difference,
equivalent to a 75% relative change. Overall, the results in this section are consistent with
banks being more likely to sell loans with a higher potential for credit rating inflation. The
results are also consistent with these loans being traded faster. Note that we only observe
quotes for the most liquid loans that have brokers providing daily prices. Since 40% (i.e.,
about eight times as many loans as in our sample) are traded (Beyhaghi and Ehsani, 2017),
the actual number of loans and investors affected by CRA conflicts is arguably quite large.
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5. Credit rating agency behavior and settlements with the DOJ
Recently, both S&P and Moody’s agreed to settlements with the DOJ for failing to
adhere to their standards when rating securitized products during the run-up to the Financial
Crisis.34 The statements of facts indicate that both CRAs deviated from their methodologies
without disclosing those changes to investors or the public. Moreover, both CRAs avoided
the downgrading of underperforming assets because doing so could negatively affect their
business (see Internet Appendix C for excerpts from these statements of facts). The results
in Section 3 show that the conflicts of interest of CRAs were pervasive and were not restricted
to structured products. S&P and Moody’s also avoided downgrading their clients when the
downgrade would translate into an increase in the borrowing costs associated with their PSD
obligations. Consistent with CRAs catering to their clients, this reluctance to downgrade is
driven precisely by those instances in which the CRA’s credit rating is the decisive one in
determining borrowing costs.
As a result of these settlements, CRAs committed to improving their credit models,
becoming more transparent, and addressing conflicts of interest more generally. In this
section, we investigate whether CRAs have delivered on these commitments.
The question of whether CRAs improved their approach to credit ratings post-settlements
cannot be answered by studying the securitized products market, where the infractions linked
to the settlements occurred. The main limitation is that the nonagency RMBS and CDO
markets virtually disappeared after the Financial Crisis. In contrast, in our setting of PSD
loans, issuances have remained relatively stable during the last 15 years (Figure IA.3).
We study whether the relationship between the probability of a downgrade and the
increase in borrowing costs after a downgrade varies with the settlements. We introduce the
indicator variable 1(post settlement), which takes the value 1 from the second quarter of 2015
(i.e., the quarter after S&P settled with the DOJ), and 0 before the second quarter of 2015.
34S&P settled with the DOJ for $1.375 billion in February 2015, and Moody’s settled for $864 million in
January 2017.
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We focus on the date of S&P’s settlement because (1) our data coverage ends in December
2016 (i.e., before the Moody’s settlement) and (2) the first (and largest) settlement in the
history of CRAs is likely to affect the rest of the market. Once again, we supplement our
main specification with this variable, as well as with the interaction between this variable
and the cost of a downgrade.
The estimation results are presented in Table 8. All specifications include the complete
set of controls and fixed effects. If CRAs changed their approach to credit ratings to deal
with conflicts of interest post-settlement, the coefficient on the interaction term should be
positive. However, Column (1) of Table 8 shows a statistically insignificant and negative
coefficient on cost of downgrade×1(post settlement). In contrast, consistent with the results
in Section 3, the coefficient on the standalone variable that represents the cost of a downgrade
continues to be statistically significant and negative. In Internet Appendix Figure IA.4, we
also consider the possibility that CRAs could have modified their credit rating behavior
before the settlement (e.g., after the DOJ investigations started). However, the figure shows
that the effect of the cost-of-downgrade variable on the probability of a downgrade is similar
for each year throughout the sample period. This is inconsistent with changes in behavior
before the settlements. Finally, Column (2) of Table 8 also yields a statistically insignificant
coefficient on cost of downgrade×1(post settlement) when considering the time required for
the firm to be downgraded after loan origination as the dependent variable in the regression.
[Insert Table 8 Here]
Overall, the previous results suggest that the DOJ settlements did not have the intended
effect of improving credit rating quality, and CRAs did not change their credit rating be-
havior, at least when rating firms associated with PSD.
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6. Conclusion
In this paper, we show evidence that conflicts of interest affect the behavior of CRAs,
specifically in the context of credit rating–dependent PSD. CRAs are significantly less likely
to downgrade borrowers if these downgrades would translate into larger increases in borrow-
ing costs for their clients. This behavior is driven by instances in which the CRA’s credit
rating is the decisive one in determining loan spreads. This indicates that CRAs cater to
their clients. In the event of a downgrade, CRAs delay their decision when the costs of
downgrading are higher.
The potential for credit inflation is, to some extent, priced at origination. This suggests
that borrowers and lenders are aware of these problems. In contrast, second market partici-
pants do not seem to internalize the conflicts of interests of CRAs: yield premiums decrease
when these loans are sold. In addition, also consistent with originating banks internalizing
the additional risk, originating banks are more likely to sell loans with high costs of down-
grade, and among the loans that they sell, loans with high cost of downgrade are also sold
faster. A concerning implication of these findings is that originating banks, arguably the
most informed market participants and the ones in an ideal position to monitor CRAs, have
little incentive to do so.
Our empirical setting allows us to rule out a series of alternative explanations. Our
within-firm estimation approach alleviates concerns that firms self-select into PSD contracts
as well as concerns about rating shopping. We also find no evidence that our results are
driven by firms hiding negative information from CRAs or by investors tacitly agreeing
to inflated credit ratings to prevent loans from becoming non-investment grade (and thus
unavailable to invest in).
Overall, our results suggest that the catering behavior of CRAs is not confined to complex
markets such as the securitized products market. The major CRAs settled with the DOJ
for inflating the credit ratings of nonagency RMBSs and CDOs during the run-up to the
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Financial Crisis, and they renewed their commitment to credit rating quality. However, we
find no evidence of reduced catering in the market for PSD post-settlements. This result
calls into question the effectiveness of the settlements in influencing CRA behavior, and it
highlights the pervasiveness of these conflicts of interest that stem from the issuer fee–based










Long-term issuer credit rating. Either from S&P or Moody’s, depending on which
CRA is decisive.
1(commodities)
Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is in the oil and gas extrac-
tion, coal mining, metal ore mining, or the support activities for mining sectors
(i.e., NAICS codes 2111, 2121, 2122, and 2131), and 0 otherwise.
Intangibles over assets Intangibles÷Assets
1(high intangibles)
Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if intangibles divided by assets is above
the sample median, and 0 otherwise.
R&D Research and development expenses (in millions USD)
1(high R&D)
Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if R&D is above the sample median,
and 0 otherwise.
1(border junk)
Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the borrower has a credit rating of
BBB- or lower, and 0 otherwise.
Loan characteristics at origination
All in spread drawn All in spread drawn above LIBOR
Loan size Total loan size (in millions USD)
Loan type




The increase in a loan’s interest spread that results from a credit downgrade of
one notch (in basis points).
Cost of 2-notch downgrade
The increase in a loan’s interest spread that results from a downgrade of two
notches (in basis points).
Cost of downgrade (% of assets)
The increase in the costs that results from a downgrade of one notch measured
as Cost of downgrade× Loan size÷Assets.
1(decisive rating)
Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CRA holds the decisive rating,
and 0 otherwise.
1(commodities shock)
Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 from 2014Q3 to 2015Q4, and 0 oth-
erwise.
1(post settlement)
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This figure shows the pricing grid from The Walt Disney Co.’s syndicated 5.25-year revolving credit facility
issued on February 23, 2005. Panel A shows that there is no change in the loan’s interest rate if the firm’s
credit rating changes from A+ to A. Panel B shows that the loan’s interest rate changes from LIBOR + 13
bps to LIBOR + 14 bps if the firm’s credit rating changes from A to A-. The 1 bps increase translates into
additional borrowing costs of $225,000 per year.
Panel A: One-notch credit rating downgrade from A+







Disney 2006 Q1 A+ AA- 11.5
Disney 2006 Q1 A+ A A+ 13
Disney 2006 Q1 A+ A- A- 14
Disney 2006 Q1 A+ BBB+ BBB+ 17.5
Disney 2006 Q1 A+ BBB- 30
Downgrade does 
not change the 
loan’s interest rate
Panel B: One-notch credit rating downgrade from A







Disney 2006 Q1 A AA- 11.5
Disney 2006 Q1 A A A+ 13
Disney 2006 Q1 A A- A- 14
Disney 2006 Q1 A BBB+ BBB+ 17.5
Disney 2006 Q1 A BBB- 30
Downgrade does 
change the loan’s 
interest rate




This figure shows the Kaplan-Meier survival curves for loans with high (i.e., above-median) and low (i.e.,
below-median) costs of downgrade at origination. The average cost of a downgrade for the former group is
22.3 bp while the average cost of a downgrade for the latter group is 6.7 bp. The analysis is restricted to the
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Dynamics of secondary market prices
This figure shows the dynamics of the pricing of loans with high cost of downgrade in the secondary market.
Loan price (measured as the average of the mid-prices quoted each quarter) is regressed on the interactions
of an indicator for above-median cost of downgrade and indicators for each quarter since loan issuance. The
regression includes the same set of control variables and fixed effects as in Column (4) of Table 2 plus loan
fixed effects, and the first four years of each loan’s lifetime are considered. The coefficients associated with
the interactions are denoted by solid circles, and the vertical bars denote the corresponding 95% confidence
interval (based on standard errors clustered by loan). The dashed vertical line denotes the average time from


































Probability of loan sale
This figure shows the probability of loan trade in the secondary market by terciles of average cost of down-
grade. The sample consists of 75 traded loans and 75 non-traded loans. The non-traded loans are selected
so that they resemble the traded loans using a nearest neighbor matching framework based on firm char-
acteristics (current credit rating, size, profitability, asset tangibility, and leverage) and loan characteristics


















Tercile of cost of downgrade
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Figure 5
Time to first sale
This figure shows the average time-to-first-trade (days) in the secondary market by terciles of average cost


































This table describes the final sample. Panel A shows summary statistics at the borrower–quarter level. Panel
B shows summary statistics for the PSD loan contracts contained in the final sample. Panel C shows overall
and within-group standard deviations for the main variables in Equation (1). A detailed description of all
variables is available in Appendix A. 1(·) denotes indicator variables.
Panel A: Borrower–quarter characteristics
N Mean SD p10 p50 p90
Cost of downgrade (bp) 20,725 13.26 11.89 0.00 10.80 25.00
Leverage 20,725 0.32 0.16 0.12 0.31 0.51
Total assets ($ billions) 20,725 22.94 57.45 2.15 8.20 45.33
Intangibles over assets 20,725 0.21 0.21 0.00 0.14 0.55
Profitability (ROA) 20,725 0.03 0.07 -0.02 0.04 0.10
1(downgrade) (percent) 20,725 2.93 16.88 0.00 0.00 0.00
Issuer credit rating (numeric) 20,725 9.07 2.61 6.00 9.00 12.00
R&D ($ millions) 9,746 279.47 634.28 0.00 69.00 704.00
Panel B: Loan characteristics
N Mean SD p10 p50 p90
Number of financial covenants 1,829 1.45 0.82 1.00 1.00 2.00
Loan amount ($ millions) 1,829 886.69 904.33 150.00 550.00 2000.00
1(secured) 1,829 0.15 0.36 0.00 0.00 1.00
Average cost of downgrade 1,829 14.59 8.65 6.50 12.50 25.00
Time to downgrade (quarters) 451 3.99 5.05 0.00 2.00 12.00
Panel C: Variation within groups
Overall SD within SD within SD within
N SD credit rating firm year
1(downgrade) 20,725 16.88 16.61 15.91 16.74
Cost of downgrade (bp) 20,725 11.89 10.66 8.81 11.71
Time to downgrade (quarters) 2,868 4.50 4.42 3.71 4.25
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Table 2
Probability of downgrade and cost of downgrade
This table shows OLS regressions for different variants of Equation (1). The dependent variable is an indicator
that takes the value of 1 if the borrower is downgraded, and 0 otherwise. The indicator is multiplied
by 100 so that regression coefficients are in percentage points. The independent variable of interest is
cost of downgrade, a measure of the increase in loan spread that would result from a credit rating downgrade
of one notch. The variable is standardized so that regression coefficients reflect the impact of changing the
variable by one standard deviation. Loan- and firm-level controls, as well as current credit rating, year, and
firm fixed effects are included as reported. Loan-level controls include loan type, amount, number of financial
covenants, whether the loan is secured, and deal purpose. Firm-level controls include size, profitability, asset
tangibility, and leverage. A detailed description of all variables is available in Appendix A. Reported standard
errors in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by firm. ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.10.
1(downgrade)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cost of downgrade -0.786*** -0.863*** -0.753*** -0.826***
(0.244) (0.218) (0.205) (0.215)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rating FE No Yes Yes Yes
Loan controls No Yes No Yes
Firm controls No No Yes Yes
N 20,725 20,725 20,725 20,725
Adj.R2 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.14
Mean of dependent variable 2.93 2.93 2.93 2.93
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Table 3
Probability of downgrade and cost of downgrade when rating is decisive
This table shows OLS regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the
borrower is downgraded, and 0 otherwise. The indicator is multiplied by 100 so that regression coefficients
are in percentage points. The independent variables of interest are cost of downgrade, 1(decisive rating),
and the interaction between the two variables. Cost of downgrade is a measure of the increase in loan spread
that would result from a credit rating downgrade of one notch. The variable is standardized so that regression
coefficients reflect the impact of changing the variable by one standard deviation. 1(decisive rating) is an
indicator that takes the value of 1 if the a potential downgrade by a credit rating agency would be the
marginal downgrade to determine the loan’s interest rate. Columns (1) and (2) shows the regression results
when S&P is the decisive credit rating agency, and Columns (3) and (4) show the regression results when
Moody’s is the decisive credit rating agency. Loan- and firm-level controls, as well as current credit rating,
year, and firm fixed effects are included as reported. Loan-level controls include loan type, amount, number
of financial covenants, whether the loan is secured, and deal purpose. Firm-level controls include size,
profitability, asset tangibility, and leverage. A detailed description of all variables is available in Appendix
A. Reported standard errors in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by firm. ***p <0.01,
**p <0.05, *p <0.10.
1(downgrade)
S&P Moody’s
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cost of downgrade 0.123 0.116 0.043 0.032
(0.356) (0.358) (0.104) (0.106)
1(decisive rating) -1.900 -1.746 2.208 2.105
(1.251) (1.267) (1.835) (1.824)
Cost of downgrade × 1(decisive rating) -0.955** -1.010** -0.820** -0.854**
(0.420) (0.427) (0.417) (0.420)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan controls No Yes No Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 20,725 20,725 20,725 20,725
Adj.R2 0.10 0.11 0.17 0.17
Mean of dependent variable 1.84 1.84 1.22 1.22
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Table 4
Probability and cost of downgrade during an observable shock to borrower quality
This table shows OLS regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the
borrower is downgraded, and 0 otherwise. The indicator is multiplied by 100 so that regression coefficients
are in percentage points. The independent variables of interest are cost of downgrade, 1(commodities),
1(commodities shock), and the interaction between the three variables. Cost of downgrade is a measure
of the increase in loan spread that would result from a credit rating downgrade of one notch. The variable
is standardized so that regression coefficients reflect the impact of changing the variable by one standard
deviation. 1(commodities) is an indicator that takes the value of 1 for firms in the following sectors: (1)
oil and gas extraction (NAICS codes 2111), (2) coal mining (2121), (3) metal ore mining (2122), and (4)
support activities for mining (2131). 1(commodities shock) is an indicator that takes the value of 1 from
the third quarter of 2014 to the end of 2015, a period in which the Dow Jones Commodity Index fell by
50%. Loan- and firm-level controls, as well as current credit rating, year, and firm fixed effects are included
as reported. Loan-level controls include loan type, amount, number of financial covenants, whether the loan
is secured, and deal purpose. Firm-level controls include size, profitability, asset tangibility, and leverage. A
detailed description of all variables is available in Appendix A. Reported standard errors in parentheses are
heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by firm. ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.10.
1(downgrade)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cost of downgrade -0.706*** -0.848*** -0.712*** -0.810***
(0.247) (0.222) (0.206) (0.219)
1(commodities) × 1(commodities shock) 6.420** 5.979** 3.738 3.436
(2.854) (2.797) (2.411) (2.433)
Cost of downgrade × 1(commodities) × 1(commodities shock) -4.917* -4.913** -4.750** -4.609**
(2.517) (2.329) (2.212) (2.194)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rating FE No Yes Yes Yes
Loan controls No Yes No Yes
Firm controls No No Yes Yes
Other interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 20,725 20,725 20,725 20,725
Adj.R2 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.14
Mean of dependent variable 2.93 2.93 2.93 2.93
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Table 5
Probability of downgrade and cost of downgrade: Firm opaqueness and non-investment grade
This table shows OLS regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the
borrower is downgraded, and 0 otherwise. The indicator is multiplied by 100 so that regression coefficients
are in percentage points. The independent variables of interest are cost of downgrade and the interaction
between cost of downgrade and indicators for above-median values of proxies for firm opaqueness and an
indicator of having a credit rating just above non-investment grade. Cost of downgrade is a measure of
the increase in loan spread that would result from a credit rating downgrade of one notch. The variable
is standardized so that regression coefficients reflect the impact of changing the variable by one standard
deviation. 1(high intangibles) is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm’s intangibles
divided by total assets is above the sample median. 1(high R&D) is an indicator variable that takes the
value of 1 if the firm’s R&D expenses are above the sample median. 1(border junk) is an indicator that
takes the value of 1 if the firm is rated BBB- (i.e., one credit rating notch above the non-investment grade
classification). All regressions include loan- and firm-level controls, as well as current credit rating, year,
and firm fixed effects. Loan-level controls include loan type, amount, number of financial covenants, whether
the loan is secured, and deal purpose. Firm-level controls include size, profitability, asset tangibility, and
leverage. A detailed description of all variables is available in Appendix A. Reported standard errors in
parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by firm. ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.10.
1(downgrade)
(1) (2) (3)
Cost of downgrade × 1(high intangibles) 0.349
(0.473)
Cost of downgrade × 1(high R&D) -0.300
(0.442)
Cost of downgrade × 1(border junk) -0.426
(0.531)






Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes
Loan controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes
N 20,725 20,725 20,725
Adj.R2 0.13 0.14 0.14
Mean of dependent variable 2.93 2.93 2.93
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Table 6
Time-to-downgrade and cost of downgrade
This table shows OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the number of quarters between loan origi-
nation and the first time the firm was downgraded. The independent variable of interest is cost of downgrade,
a measure of the increase in loan spread that would result from a credit rating downgrade of one notch. The
variable is standardized so that regression coefficients reflect the impact of changing the variable by one
standard deviation. Loan- and firm-level controls, as well as current credit rating, year, and firm fixed ef-
fects are included as reported. Loan-level controls include loan type, amount, number of financial covenants,
whether the loan is secured, and deal purpose. Firm-level controls include size, profitability, asset tangibility,
and leverage. A detailed description of all variables is available in Appendix A. Reported standard errors in
parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by firm. ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.10.
Time to downgrade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cost of downgrade 1.137** 1.716** 1.232* 2.204**
(0.525) (0.791) (0.663) (0.882)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rating FE No Yes Yes Yes
Loan controls No Yes No Yes
Firm controls No No Yes Yes
N 257 257 257 257
Adj.R2 0.77 0.81 0.80 0.81
Mean of dependent variable 5.08 5.08 5.08 5.08
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Table 7
Loan pricing at initiation and average cost of downgrade
This table shows OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the loan spread at origination. The
independent variable of interest is average cost of downgrade, the average increase in interest rates after a
downgrade by one notch over the lifetime of a loan. The variable is standardized so that regression coefficients
reflect the impact of changing the variable by one standard deviation. Loan- and firm-level controls, as well
as credit rating at origination, year, and firm fixed effects are included as reported. Loan-level controls
include loan type, amount, number of financial covenants, whether the loan is secured, and deal purpose.
Firm-level controls include size, profitability, asset tangibility, and leverage. A detailed description of all
variables is available in Appendix A. Reported standard errors in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust
and clustered by firm. ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.10.
Loan spread
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average cost of downgrade 10.139*** 6.860*** 8.651*** 6.708***
(2.393) (2.325) (2.527) (2.326)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rating at origination FE No Yes Yes Yes
Loan controls No Yes No Yes
Firm controls No No Yes Yes
N 1,814 1,814 1,814 1,814
Adj.R2 0.66 0.75 0.71 0.75
Mean of dependent variable 112.37 112.37 112.37 112.37
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Table 8
Probability of downgrade and cost of downgrade: The effect of DOJ settlements
This table shows OLS regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if
the borrower is downgraded (Column (1)) or the number of quarters between loan origination and the first
time the firm was downgraded (Column (2)). The independent variables of interest are cost of downgrade
and the interaction between cost of downgrade and 1(post settlement). Cost of downgrade is a measure
of the increase in loan spread that would result from a credit rating downgrade of one notch. The variable
is standardized so that regression coefficients reflect the impact of changing the variable by one standard
deviation. 1(post settlement) is an indicator that takes the value of 1 for the quarters after the settlement
between S&P and the DOJ in February 2015. All regressions include loan- and firm-level controls, as well
as current credit rating, year, and firm fixed effects. A detailed description of all variables is available in
Appendix A. Loan-level controls include loan type, amount, number of financial covenants, whether the loan
is secured, and deal purpose. Firm-level controls include size, profitability, asset tangibility, and leverage.
Reported standard errors in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by firm. ***p <0.01,
**p <0.05, *p <0.10.
1(downgrade) Time to downgrade
(1) (2)
Cost of downgrade -0.640*** 0.421
(0.175) (0.257)
Cost of downgrade × 1(post settlement) -0.465 0.536
(0.539) (1.823)
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Rating FE Yes Yes
Loan controls Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes
N 20,725 257
Adj.R2 0.10 0.86
Mean of dependent variable 1.84 4.60
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Internet Appendix
Credit Rating Inflation: Is It Still Relevant and Who Prices It?
This internet appendix is divided into two sections. The first section describes the sec-
ondary market data and its matching with DealScan. The second section provides supple-
mentary figures and tables.
A. Secondary market data
LPC collects self-reported data starting from 1998 from brokers that quote prices on sec-
ondary market loans. There are 27,129 unique loans in the database which are identified by
a proprietary loan identification number (lin). Refinitiv provides a proprietary “translation
matrix” linking lin to the FacilityID identifiers from DealScan. This link is available for
22,671 loans.
Not all loans with quotes in LPC are featured in DealScan. In fact, a direct merge
between the two complete databases using the translation matrix matches 4.9% of the 379
thousand unique FacilityIDs in DealScan. This low matching rate is partly explained by the
fact that loans traded less frequently in the past–the fraction of traded loans increased from
10% in the early 2000s to 40% in 2013 (Beyhaghi and Ehsani (2017)). It is likely that LPC
has low coverage for loans that are sold infrequently, and loans that are sold directly without
the involvement of a broker.
We are able to match 75 of the 1,814 facilities in our loan sample, which translates
into a 4.1% matching rate. One reason why our matching rate is slightly lower than the
overall matching rate of 4.9% is that 80% of our sample are revolving loan facilities, whereas
revolving loans represent only about 40% of loans in DealScan. Revolving loans are traded
less frequently, with only about 14% of loans with secondary market data being revolving
loans.
Since our matched sample is small, we formally test whether these loans are different
from the universe of traded loans or from the PSD loans in our sample that are not in the
secondary market data. In Table IA.14, we compare the 75 matched loans to the remaining
loans traded in the secondary market. We find that while matched loans tend to be offered
at lower discounts upon their first quote and exhibit lower standard deviations of their price
over time, these differences are not statistically significant. The only statistically significant
difference is that matched loans have an average of 1.5 brokers quoting a price on them,
compared to an average of 2.2 brokers for non-matched loans. Overall, the matched loans
seem to be representative of the universe of traded loans.
1
In Table IA.15, we compare the firms that issued our 75 matched loans to the firms that
issued the remaining PSD loans in our sample. These two types of borrowers are similar
across most dimensions. However, the matched firms tend to have credit ratings about 1.5
notches below and larger loans than their counterparts. To avoid any observable difference
from impacting our comparison between traded and non-traded loans, we use a nearest
neighbor matching framework in our analysis of whether loans are more likely to be traded
if they feature higher costs of downgrades. We test for differences between the two types
of loans in Table IA.13. We find that there are no economically or statistically significant
differences between the firms in the two samples.
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B. Supplementary figures and tables
Figure IA.1
Distribution of credit ratings at origination
The figure shows the distribution of credit ratings at the time of loan origination for our sample of credit
rating–based PSD loans. The credit rating scale is simplified by combining the credit ratings within each
letter credit rating category. For example, we combine the initial credit ratings of A+, A, and A- into one
group, A.






















This figure shows the distribution of the average cost of a downgrade for our sample of credit rating–based
PSD loans by credit rating at origination. The credit rating scale is simplified by combining the credit
ratings within each letter credit rating category. For example, we combine the initial credit ratings of A+,
A, and A- into one group, A.
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Annual volume of newly issued credit rating rating-based PSD



























Coefficient estimate on cost of downgrade by year
This figure shows the effect of a one standard deviation increase in cost of downgrade on the probability
that the borrower is downgraded, by year. We regress an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the borrower
is downgraded on the interaction between cost of downgrade (a measure of the increase in the loan spread
that would result from a credit rating downgrade of one notch) and indicator variables for each year. cost
of downgrade is standardized so that regression coefficients reflect the impact of changing the variable by
one standard deviation. Loan- and firm-level controls, as well as current credit rating, year, and firm fixed
effects are included in the regression. The coefficients (in percentage points) associated with the interactions
are denoted by solid circles, and the vertical bars denote the corresponding 95% confidence interval (based
























































Accounting ratio–based PSD loans versus credit rating–based PSD loans
This table compares a sample of accounting ratio–based PSD loans with our sample of credit rating–based
PSD loans across observable characteristics. Observations are at the loan–year level. 1(·) denotes indica-
tor variables. Statistical significance computations are based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors
clustered by firm. ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.10.
Mean
Accounting ratio–based Credit rating–based Difference
Leverage 0.40 0.32 0.08***
Total assets ($ billions) 3.46 22.94 -19.47***
Intangibles over assets 0.30 0.21 0.09***
Profitability (ROA) 0.02 0.03 -0.01**
R&D ($ millions) 64.51 279.47 -214.96***
Number of financial covenants 2.76 1.52 1.24***
Loan amount ($ millions) 321.25 868.72 -547.48***
1(secured) 0.88 0.17 0.71***
Cost of one grid (rating or ratio, bp) 16.79 13.26 3.52***
N 17,756 20,725 38,481
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Table IA.2
Robustness for Table 2: Year–quarter fixed effects
Regressions reported in this table are identical to Table 2, except that the regressions include year–quarter
fixed effects instead of year fixed effects. Reported standard errors in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-
robust and clustered by firm. ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.10.
1(downgrade)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cost of downgrade -0.784*** -0.841*** -0.739*** -0.807***
(0.243) (0.220) (0.206) (0.216)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rating FE No Yes Yes Yes
Loan controls No Yes No Yes
Firm controls No No Yes Yes
N 20,725 20,725 20,725 20,725
Adj.R2 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.15
Mean of dependent variable 2.93 2.93 2.93 2.93
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Table IA.3
Robustness for Table 2: Loan fixed effects
Regressions reported in this table are identical to Table 2, except that the regressions include loan fixed
effects instead of firm fixed effects. Reported standard errors in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust
and clustered by firm. ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.10.
1(downgrade)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cost of downgrade -1.885** -1.835*** -1.723*** -1.723***
(0.746) (0.614) (0.638) (0.638)
Loan FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rating FE No Yes Yes Yes
Loan controls No Yes No Yes
Firm controls No No Yes Yes
N 20,625 20,625 20,625 20,625
Adj.R2 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.13
Mean of dependent variable 2.92 2.92 2.92 2.92
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Table IA.4
Robustness for Table 2: Cost of downgrade based on two-notch downgrades
Regressions reported in this table are identical to Table 2, except that the variable for the cost of downgrade
is based on two-notch downgrades instead of one-notch downgrades. Reported standard errors in parentheses
are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by firm. ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.10.
1(downgrade)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cost downgrade 2 notches -1.456*** -1.292*** -1.067*** -1.151***
(0.358) (0.290) (0.260) (0.278)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rating FE No Yes Yes Yes
Loan controls No Yes No Yes
Firm controls No No Yes Yes
N 20,106 20,106 20,106 20,106
Adj.R2 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.14
Mean of dependent variable 2.98 2.98 2.98 2.98
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Table IA.5
Robustness for Table 2: Cost of downgrade as fraction of total assets
Regressions reported in this table are identical to Table 2, except that the variable for the cost of down-
grade is constructed as a dollar cost divided by total assets. Reported standard errors in parentheses are
heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by firm. ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.10.
1(downgrade)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cost of downgrade (% of assets) -0.814*** -1.048*** -0.560*** -0.742***
(0.197) (0.210) (0.192) (0.209)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rating FE No Yes Yes Yes
Loan controls No Yes No Yes
Firm controls No No Yes Yes
N 20,725 20,725 20,725 20,725
Adj.R2 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.13
Mean of dependent variable 2.93 2.93 2.93 2.93
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Table IA.6
Robustness for Table 2: Separate estimation for S&P and Moody’s
Regressions reported in this table are identical to Table 2, except that the regressions are estimated separately
for borrowers rated by S&P (Columns (1) and (2)) and Moody’s (Columns (3) and (4)). Reported standard
errors in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by firm. ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.10.
1(downgrade)
S&P Moody’s
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cost of downgrade -1.107*** -1.201*** -0.639* -0.759*
(0.226) (0.238) (0.339) (0.390)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan controls No Yes No Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 15,402 15,402 5,316 5,316
Adj.R2 0.11 0.11 0.21 0.21
Mean of dependent variable 2.05 2.05 4.72 4.72
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Table IA.7
Placebo test for Table 2: Sample of accounting ratio-based PSD loans
Regressions reported in this table are identical to Table 2, except the regressions are estimated using a
sample of accounting ratio–based PSD loans (instead of credit rating–based PSD loans) and the independent
variable of interest is cost of moving to lower ratio bracket, which represents the interest rate increase that
would result from declining by one bracket in the pricing grid. Reported standard errors in parentheses are
heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by firm. ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.10.
1(downgrade)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cost of moving to lower ratio-bracket 1.423*** 1.178*** 0.963*** 0.977***
(0.337) (0.313) (0.320) (0.326)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rating FE No Yes Yes Yes
Loan controls No Yes No Yes
Firm controls No No Yes Yes
N 17,756 17,756 17,756 17,756
Adj.R2 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.18
Mean of dependent variable 3.48 3.48 3.48 3.48
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Table IA.8
Robustness for Table 3: CRA–firm fixed effects
Regressions reported in this table are identical to Table 3, except the regressions include CRA–firm fixed
effects instead of firm fixed effects. Reported standard errors in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust
and clustered by firm. ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.10.
1(downgrade)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cost of downgrade -0.144 -0.140 -0.139 -0.152
(0.255) (0.251) (0.243) (0.255)
Cost of downgrade × 1(decisive rating) -0.876** -0.922*** -0.797*** -0.867***
(0.361) (0.323) (0.306) (0.322)
Firm × CRA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rating FE No Yes Yes Yes
Loan controls No Yes No Yes
Firm controls No No Yes Yes
N 20,712 20,712 20,712 20,712
Adj.R2 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.12
Mean of dependent variable 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83
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Table IA.9
Robustness for Table 4: Alternative definition of the commodities shock variable
Regressions reported in this table are identical to Table 4, except that the variable 1(commodities shock)
is defined to take the value of 1 between 2014Q3 and 2016Q4. Reported standard errors in parentheses are
heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by firm. ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.10.
1(downgrade)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cost of downgrade -0.675*** -0.846*** -0.697*** -0.799***
(0.240) (0.216) (0.200) (0.214)
1(commodities) × 1(commodities shock extended) 6.680*** 4.742*** 2.209 1.750
(1.975) (1.756) (1.908) (1.902)
Cost of downgrade × 1(commodities) × 1(commodities shock extended) -5.863*** -4.756*** -4.448** -4.183**
(2.023) (1.768) (2.052) (2.022)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rating FE No Yes Yes Yes
Loan controls No Yes No Yes
Firm controls No No Yes Yes
Other interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 20,725 20,725 20,725 20,725
Adj.R2 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.14
Mean of dependent variable 2.93 2.93 2.93 2.93
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Table IA.10
Robustness for Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5: Continuous proxies for firm opaqueness
Regressions reported in this table are identical to those in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, except the
regressions include continuous variables for the firm’s intangibles divided by total assets and log(R&D)
instead of indicator variables. Reported standard errors in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust and
clustered by firm. ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.10.
1(downgrade)
(1) (2)
Cost of downgrade × Intangibles over assets 0.770
(1.375)
Cost of downgrade × log(R&D) 0.039
(0.115)
Cost of downgrade -0.965*** -1.149***
(0.259) (0.418)




Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Rating FE Yes Yes
Loan controls Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes
N 20,725 9,746
Adj.R2 0.14 0.13
Mean of dependent variable 2.93 3.04
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Table IA.11
Robustness for Column (3) of Table 5: Alternative definitions of the border junk variable
Regressions reported in this table are identical to those in Column (3) of Table 5, except the regressions
include alternative definitions of 1(border junk). 1(border junk) (2notches) is an indicator that takes the
value of 1 if the firm is rated BBB- or BBB (i.e., one or two credit rating notches above the non-investment
grade classification threshold). 1(border junk)(3notches) is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the firm
is rated BBB-, BBB, or BBB+. 1(border junk)(4notches) is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the firm
is rated BBB-, BBB, BBB+, or A-. Reported standard errors in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust
and clustered by firm. ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.10.
1(downgrade)
(1) (2) (3)
Cost of downgrade -0.599** -0.613** -0.917*
(0.247) (0.258) (0.485)
Cost of downgrade × 1(border junk) (2 notches) -0.636
(0.509)
Cost of downgrade × 1(border junk) (3 notches) -0.539
(0.483)
Cost of downgrade × 1(border junk) (4 notches) 0.105
(0.521)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes
Loan controls Yes No Yes
Firm controls No Yes Yes
N 20,725 20,725 20,725
Adj.R2 0.14 0.14 0.14
Mean of dependent variable 2.93 2.93 2.93
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Table IA.12
Robustness for Table 7
Regressions reported in this table are identical to Table 7, except the variable for the average cost of a
downgrade is computed as the average increase in interest rates after a downgrade by one notch across all
levels of the initial loan contract (as opposed to the realized avgerage cost of a downgrade over the lifetime
of the loan). Reported standard errors in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by firm.
***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.10.
Loan spread
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Avg. cost of downgrade 4.806*** 4.060*** 4.393*** 4.011***
(0.447) (0.379) (0.396) (0.381)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rating at origination FE No Yes Yes Yes
Loan controls No Yes No Yes
Firm controls No No Yes Yes
N 1,736 1,732 1,735 1,732
Adj.R2 0.76 0.81 0.80 0.81
Mean of dependent variable 111.91 111.78 111.96 111.78
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Table IA.13
Traded versus non-traded loans
This table compares the subsample of traded loans in the sample with the matched non-traded loans across
observable characteristics. The non-traded loans are selected so that they resemble the traded loans using a
nearest neighbor matching framework based on firm characteristics (current credit rating, size, profitability,
asset tangibility, and leverage) and loan characteristics (amount, number of financial covenants, and whether
the loan is secured or not). Observations are at the loan level. 1(·) denotes indicator variables. Statistical sig-
nificance computations are based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***p <0.01,
**p <0.05, *p <0.10.
Mean
Traded Not traded Difference
Leverage 0.35 0.35 0
Total assets (log) 9.37 9.32 0.05
Intangibles over assets 0.28 0.27 0.01
Profitability (ROA) 0.03 0.02 0.01
Issuer credit rating (numeric) 10.05 10.09 -0.04
Number of financial covenants 1.57 1.56 0.01
Loan amount ($ millions) 1339 1317 21




Traded loans in sample versus traded loans not in sample
This table compares the subsample of traded loans in the sample with the remaining traded loans in LPC
across observable characteristics. Observations are at the loan level. 1(·) denotes indicator variables. Note,
since LPC does not provide a firm identifier for all traded loans, standard errors are not clustered. ***p <0.01,
**p <0.05, *p <0.10.
Mean
In sample Not in sample Difference
Initial quote (mid spread) 98.3 94.9 3.38
Standard deviation of quotes 1.19 3.93 -2.73




Traded loans versus remaining PSD loans
This table compares the subsample of traded loans in the sample with the remaining loans across observable
characteristics. Observations are at the loan level. 1(·) denotes indicator variables. Statistical signifi-
cance computations are based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***p <0.01,
**p <0.05, *p <0.10.
Mean
Traded Not traded Difference
Leverage 0.35 0.32 0.03
Total assets (log) 9.37 9.09 0.29
Intangibles over assets 0.28 0.20 0.08
Profitability (ROA) 0.03 0.03 0.00
Issuer credit rating (numeric) 10.05 8.62 1.43**
Number of financial covenants 1.57 1.46 0.11
Loan amount ($ millions) 1339 875 464**
1(secured) 1.17 1.15 0.02
N 75 1,739
21
